#Rix v. general motors corp series#
To that end, the appellant authorized and directed the other defendants to engage in a series of activities which, the plaintiff claims in his first two causes of action, violated his right to privacy. According to the complaint-which, for present purposes, we must assume to be true-the appellant, having learned of the imminent publication of the plaintiff's book 'Unsafe at any Speed,' decided to conduct a campaign of intimidation against him in order to 'suppress plaintiff's criticism of and prevent his disclosure of information' about its products. The plaintiff, an author and lecturer on automotive safety, has, for some years, been an articulate and severe critic of General Motors' products from the standpoint of safety and design. This appeal concerns only the legal sufficiency of the first two causes of action, which were upheld in the courts below as against the appellant's motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211, subd. The first two causes of action charge an invasion of privacy, the third is predicated on the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress and the fourth on interference with the plaintiff's economic advantage. The complaint, in this action by Ralph Nader, pleads four causes of action against the appellant, General Motors Corporation, and three otherÄefendants allegedly acting as its agents. On this appeal, taken by permission of the Appellate Division on a certified question, we are called upon to determine the reach of the tort of invasion of privacy as it exists under the law of the District of Columbia. Rheingold, New York City, for respondent. Rifkind, New York City, Martin Kleinbard, Rye, and Allan Blumstein, New York City, for appellant. P appealed a jury verdict for D in that the jury was not properly instructed on manufacturing defects.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant, et al., Defendants. D also contended that the single system was neither a design defect nor unreasonably dangerous and that the accident would have occurred even if the truck had been equipped with a dual brake system. D contends that the tube had been altered after it left the assembly line so that the defective tube was not D's responsibility. P maintains the accident would have been less severe or would not have happened had the truck been equipped with a dual system. P also contends that the brake system on the truck, a single system, was defectively designed, and argues that D's knowledge of available technology coupled with the foreseeable use of the vehicle should have mandated a dual braking system, which provides extra braking power. P contends that the tube broke because there was a manufacturing defect in the tube when the truck came off the assembly line. Witnesses also testified that the brake tube came out of the nut either because the tube broke or was improperly flared. Expert testimony from both parties established that the fluids necessary to the braking system had escaped when a brake tube came out of a nut where it fastened to the top of the Hydrovac, a booster unit. The parties stipulated that the accident occurred because of brake failure. P maintains the product was unreasonably dangerous because of both manufacturing and design defects. P sued D on a theory of strict liability. P was injured when the pickup he was driving was hit from behind by a 1978 General Motors Corporation (GMC) two-ton chassis-cab, which had been equipped with a water tank after sale by the GMC dealer.